I really enjoyed this op-ed piece in the NYT today. Written by two professors, it discusses some of the problems that are preventing the renegotiation of mortgages. To summarize the problem, many mortgages are no longer held at a single bank, but have been pooled with other mortgages, packaged into Mortgage Backed Securities (which may have been further packaged into Collateralized Debt Obligations) and sold off to a wide array of investors. The problem with this is that rather than a single mortgage holder, a mortgage now has many thousands of holders, each with a legal claim to a piece of the mortgage payments. However, this problem has been addressed in the securitization contracts: a party called a “master servicer” is assigned to manage the pools of loans.
Now under any functioning free market system, when you get into these default situations, it usually behooves the lender and the borrower to rework the debt. Absent the situation where the borrower has absolutely no means to meet their obligations, the lender is usually better off reducing the debt payment by adjusting the interest rate or reducing the principal due (compare to the alternative in foreclosure, which involves a complex and costly legal process, with an auction that may not give you very good returns). However, it looks like these master servicers have a very unique set of incentives to do the opposite:
Most anything a master servicer does to rework a loan will create big winners but also some big losers among the security holders to whom the servicer holds equal duties. So the servicers feel safer doing nothing. By allowing foreclosures to proceed without much intervention, they avoid potentially huge lawsuits by injured security holders.
On top of the legal risks, reworking loans can be costly for master servicers.
Last, some big master servicers are part of, or have now been bought out by, the very companies that own the securities that can be affected by the reworking or foreclosure decisions the master servicer makes. This conflict [because there is now the hint that the master servicers may make decisions that will disproportionatley favor their owners] further increases the chances of litigation and contributes to inaction.
So the profs propose the following:
To solve this problem, we propose legislation that moves the reworking function from the paralyzed master servicers and transfers it to community-based, government-appointed trustees. These trustees would be given no information about which securities are derived from which mortgages, or how those securities would be affected by the reworking and foreclosure decisions they make.
Instead of worrying about which securities might be harmed, the blind trustees would consider, loan by loan, whether a reworking would bring in more money than a foreclosure. The government expense would be limited to paying for the trustees — no small amount of money, but much cheaper than first paying off the security holders by buying out the loans, which would then have to be reworked anyway. Our plan would also be far more efficient than having judges attempt this role. The trustees would be hired from the ranks of community bankers, and thus have the expertise the judiciary lacks.
Well, I'm hating the TARP and the various central bank interventions. And McCain's random n-th hour proposal to spend $300b in TARP money to simply buy out flailing mortgages at cost was a bit looney-tunes. This? I'm Ok with this.
It's using the government as facilitator, rather than government standing in for a trading partner. Warms the cockles of that part of my heart which is not dead.
On a related note, I was thinking about the tax consequences of debt forgiveness while I was reading this article. Generally speaking, I believe that if a debt is canceled, that gives rise to ordinary income (which is taxed then at ordinary income rates). So if there is an adjustment of principal, the difference would immediately become ordinary income for the borrower, which he would have to report on his yearly income tax filing. Obviously, with the government playing facilitator, it would be kinda hard to evade this. There are some exceptions to the rule that cancellation of debt gives rise to ordinary income, mainly in situations of bankruptcy and insolvency. Maybe the borrower might get some leeway on insolvency, but it seems that if you are qualify for loan modification, you are probably not insolvent (just cash flow problems).
This can kinda suck, and the borrower could get stuck with a large tax bill.
So even if the mortgage trustee program is not implemented, and we continue to rely on master servicers or judicial cram-down, it seems a predecessor step would be to fix the tax code so that the cancellation of debt income would either book at some later date, or that it could be booked in yearly installments over a period of years.
Link of the date: Discussion of the Fed's Balance Sheet (Scary in honor of Mischief Night)
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